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Abstract - Online Social Networks (OSNs) are inherently designed to enable people to share personal 
and public information and make social connections with others. These OSNs provides digital social 
interactions and social as well as personal information sharing, but in sharing a number of security 
and privacy problems raised. While OSNs allow users to restrict access to shared data, they currently 
do not provide any mechanism to totally enforce privacy issue solver associated with multiple users. 
To this end, we propose an approach to enable the protection of shared data associated with 
multiple users in OSNs. We formulate an access control model to capture the essence of multiparty 
authorization requirements, along with a multiparty policy specification scheme and a policy 
enforcement mechanism. Besides we also implement a proof-of-concept prototype which is called 
as MController (multi controller) having contributor, stakeholder and disseminator controllers along 
with owner controller.       
Indexterms : social network, multi party access control, MController, decision voting.      
GJCST-E Classification :  J.4 
 
Privacy Management of Multi User Environment in Online Social Networks OSNs 
                                                                         
 
Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:
 
 
 
Privacy Management of Multi User Environment 
in Online Social Networks (OSNs) 
P. Amrutha α & R. Sathiyaraj σ
Abstract - Online Social Networks (OSNs) are inherently 
designed to enable people to share personal and public 
information and make social connections with others. These 
OSNs provides digital social interactions and social as well as 
personal information sharing, but in sharing a number of 
security and privacy problems raised. While OSNs allow users 
to restrict access to shared data, they currently do not provide 
any mechanism to totally enforce privacy issue solver 
associated with multiple users. To this end, we propose an 
approach to enable the protection of shared data associated 
with multiple users in OSNs. We formulate an access control 
model to capture the essence of multiparty authorization 
requirements, along with a multiparty policy specification 
scheme and a policy enforcement mechanism. Besides we 
also implement a proof-of-concept prototype which is called 
as MController (multi controller) having contributor, 
stakeholder and disseminator controllers along with owner 
controller. 
Indexterms : social network, multi party access control, 
MController, decision voting.  
I. Introduction 
any people interested to share personal and 
public information and make social connections 
with friends, family, colleagues, coworkers and 
even with strangers through Online Social 
Networks(OSN) such like Facebook, Twitter, Google+ 
and etc,. OSN provide some space to each user for 
basic profile and sharing photos and videos with others. 
In photo sharing unfortunately some privacy and 
security problems are raised. Presently there is no 
mechanism to totally avoid these privacy issues. The 
main problem is collaborative authorization 
management, means if user tags the photo to his friend 
only. But the updates of photo are presented in both 
user as well as friends profiles. Then friend of friends or 
others may share that photo. So here the user expected 
privacy was spoiled. The existing protection for photos 
is binary condition either put or delete in profile space. If 
the photo was deleted after tagging, the content may 
loss in space, else the privacy was spoiled. 
a) OSNs Privacy 
    
 
   
 
restrict access to a specific set of trusted users. Despite 
the spectrum of available privacy settings, users have 
no control over information appearing outside their 
immediate profile page, when a user comment on 
friend’s image, user and friend both cannot restrict the 
comment from other viewers. Similarly, if a user posts a 
photo and indicates the name of a friend in the photo, 
the friend cannot specify which users can view the 
photo. For both of these cases, Facebook currently 
lacks a mechanism to satisfy privacy constraints when 
multiuser is involved, So that the user's privacy may be 
violated. Privacy conflicts publicly expose personal 
information, slowly decreasing a user's privacy. 
The user would have more control over his 
photos where a set of malicious users may want to 
make a shared photo available to a wider audience. If 
the malicious users can access the photo from original 
user then they tag photo with fake identities to others. 
Those may further share with other users. This 
continuous process, by this the original photo may 
change totally and shared with number of persons. At 
that time the privacy of photo which was expected by 
original user may collude totally. To prevent such an 
attack, three conditions need to be satisfied:  
• No Fake Identity in OSNs.  
• All Tagged Users are Real Users for the Photo. 
• All Controllers are Honest to specify their Privacy 
policies for the photo. 
II. MController 
OSN is mainly relationship network including set 
of users as well as their data. So that OSN represented 
with directed labeled graph where each node represents 
user and edge denotes relationship between two users. 
The edge direction denotes the relationship from initial 
to terminal node. The profile space of the user managed 
himself with his privacy data and content. For that 
privacy data to maintain security several schemes are 
introduced. But no scheme gives totally security, mainly 
all those schemes have only one controller that is owner. 
By this single controller security and privacy issues may 
be raised on data which was personal to the owner. 
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In OSNs privacy restrictions form a spectrum 
between public and private data. On the public end, 
users can allow every particular OSN member to view 
their personal content. On the private   end, users can 
Authors  α σ : JNTU Anantpur, India.
E-mails : p.amruthamtech@gmail.com, sathiya.peace@gmail.com
Figure 1 :
 
MController Architecture
 
So that rather than the owner controlling 
additional controllers are need for the flexible privacy 
mechanisms in OSN. The additional controllers are 
contributor, stakeholder and disseminator which provide 
their own privacy policies on shared
 
data by giving the 
permission either permit or deny to unauthorized user 
on shared data. Figure 1 illustrates different controllers 
providing their privacy policies on shared data. We 
define multi controllers as follows:
 
•
 
Owner (O)
 
: 
 
In the social network
 
the user u is 
called the owner of the data item d, if d presents in 
the space m of user u. The user u is also called as 
contributor of d, when that user share data item d. 
The owner share data in three types, they are profile 
sharing, content sharing and relationship sharing. It 
enables the owner to discover potential malicious 
activities in collaborative control.
 
•
 
Contributor (C)
 
:  In the social network the user u is 
called the contributor of the data item d, if d 
published by user u in someone else’s space. The 
contributor tags content to other’s space and the 
content may also have multiple stakeholders (e.g., 
tagged users). The memory space for the user will 
be allotted according to user request for content 
sharing.
 
•
 
Stakeholder (S)
 
: In the social network the user u is 
called a stakeholder of the data item d, if user u is 
tagged user T for d. A shared content has multiple 
stakeholders.
 
•
 
Disseminator (D)
 
: In the social network, let d be a 
data item shared by a user u from someone else’s 
space to his/her space. The user u is called a 
disseminator of d. the real content sharing starts 
with the owner, then disseminator views the content 
and shares with others. This disseminated content 
may be re-disseminated again and again by others.
 
III. Multi Party Access Control 
(MPAC) Model 
a) MPAC Specification 
It is very essential for MPAC policies to regulate 
access and representing authorization requirements 
from multiple associated users to enable a collaborative 
authorization management of data sharing in OSNs. 
• Accessor Specification : Accessor is the set of users 
who granted to access the shared data. Accessor 
can be represented with a set of user names, 
relationship names and group names in OSNs. 
The accessor specification is defined as a set, 
accessors = {a1, a2. . . , an}, where each element is a 
tuple < ac,at >. where ac ∈ U ∪ RT ∪ G be a user u ∈ 
U, a relationship type rt ∈ RT, or a group g ∈ G.  at ∈ 
{UN,RN,GN} be the type of the accessor specification, 
where UN,RN,GN represents user name, relationship 
name, and group name.  
• Data Specification : The data specification repress-
ented in three ways; profile, relationship and content 
sharing. For effective privacy the different controllers 
provide sensitivity levels on data. 
Let dt ∈ D be a data item, sl be a sensitivity 
level (range 0.00 to 1.00) for data item dt. The data 
specification is defined as a tuple < dt, sl >. 
b) MPAC Policy 
To summarize the above-mentioned specifi-
cation elements, we introduce the definition of a 
multiparty access control policy as follows: 
The multi party access control policy is a 5 - 
tuple P = < controller, Ctype, accessor, data, effect > 
where 
• Controller is a user who can regulate the access of 
data. 
• Ctype is the type of the controller. 
• Accessor is the set of users who granted to access 
the shared data. 
• Data is represents a data specification. 
• Effect ∈ {permit, deny} is the authorization effect of 
the policy. Suppose a controller can leverage five 
sensitivity levels: 0.00 (none), 0.25 (low), 0.50 
(medium), 0.75 (high), and 1.00 (highest) for the 
shared data.  
c) MPAC Evaluation 
Multi party access control is evaluated in two 
steps. In step-1, the individual decision are collected 
from different controllers, and in step-2, individual 
decision are aggregated and makes final decision for 
the access request. 
Figure 2 illustrates that how MPAC evaluated in 
step by step. Initially an access request goes to under 
policy evaluation, which is done under four controllers. 
The four controllers provide their own privacy policies in 
the form of decision either permit or deny in step-1 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
  
  
  
 V
ol
um
e 
X
III
 I
ss
ue
 X
 V
er
sio
n 
I 
  
  
 
  
2
  
 
(
DDDD D DDD
)
Y
e
a
r
01
3
2
E
process. After giving decisions by individual controllers, 
they are aggregated and make final decision by using 
decision voting schemes in step-2 process. The final 
decision making decides whether the access request is 
allowed or refused.  
 Figure 2 :
 
MPAC Evaluation
 From the process of evaluation in MPAC 
policies, the controllers give different decision for an 
access request. There may be a chance of occurring 
conflicts. So that a mechanism is needed to resolute the 
conflicts for taking an unambiguous decision for each 
access request. For the better privacy, a strong 
resolution for conflict may need. So it is better to 
consider tradeoff between privacy and utility in 
resolution of conflict. For this conflict issue, we introduce 
decision voting schemes resolving the MPAC conflicts 
which is simple and flexible.
 
IV. Final Decision Making Schemes 
a) Decision Voting Mechanism 
Decision making mainly depends on majority. 
For such decision making, we introduce a voting 
scheme for conflict resolution. In voting mechanism 
each controller’s individual decision effects the final 
decision. Mainly this voting scheme is described in two 
voting mechanisms; they are decision voting and 
sensitivity voting. 
i. Decision Voting  
The policy evaluation derives the decision 
voting value (DV) either permit or deny as follows, Where 
Evaluation (p) represents the policy p decision:  
DV = j        0 if Evaluation(p) = Deny 
                  1 if Evaluation(p) = Permit          
Assume that all controllers are equally 
important, an aggregated decision value (DVag) (range 
0.00 to 1.00) from multiple controllers including the 
owner (DVow), the contributor (DVcb) and stakeholders 
(DVst), is computed with following equation: 
DVag=(DVow+DVcb+∑i∈SS DVist)×1/m  
Where SS is the set of stakeholders for shared 
data item, and m is total number of controllers for 
shared data item.  
For the shared data item each controller may 
have (i) a different trust level over the data owner and (ii) 
a different reputation value in terms of collaborative 
control. So we need to introduce weights for decision 
voting scheme. Weights for different controllers can be 
calculated by aggregating trust levels and reputation 
values. The weight of controller x is “weightx / sum of 
weights”. Suppose ωow, ωcb and ωi sh are weights for 
owner, contributor and stakeholder controllers, 
respectively, and n is the number of stakeholders of the 
shared data item. A weighted decision voting scheme is 
as follows: 
DVag=(ωow×DVow+ωcb×DVcb+∑i=1ton(ωist×DVist))  
×1/(ωow+ωcb+∑i=1ton ωist)                   
(3)
 
ii. Sensitivity Voting 
Each controller assigns a sensitivity level (SL) to 
the shared data item to reflect her/his privacy concern. A 
sensitivity score (SC) (range 0.00 to 1.00) for the data 
item can be calculated based on following equation: 
SC=(SLow+SLcb+∑ i∈SS SList)×1/m              
b) Threshold-Based Conflict Resolution 
A basic idea of our approach for threshold-
based conflict resolution is that the sensitivity score (SC) 
can be utilized as a threshold for decision making. 
Obviously, if SC increased, then the chance of final 
decision to deny is increased, so that the utility of OSN 
services cannot be affected. The threshold-based 
conflict resolution calculates final decision as follows: 
Decision = j         Permit if DVag > SC 
                            Deny if DVag ≤ SC        
(5)
 
It is worth noticing that our conflict resolution 
approach has an adaptive feature which reflects the 
changes of policies and sensitivity levels. If any 
controller changes his privacy policy or sensitivity level 
on the shared data item, then the aggregated decision 
value (DVag) and the sensitivity score (SC) will be 
recomputed and accordingly the final decision may be 
changed. 
c) Strategy-Based Conflict Resolution 
If we treat all controllers equally important, then 
above threshold-based conflict resolution provides a 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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(4)
(2)
(1)
simple mechanism for making final decision. But in 
practical, different controllers may have different 
priorities making final decision. Especially the owner has 
highest priority in the control of shred data item. So that 
we provide strategy-based conflict resolution 
mechanism to satisfy owner authorization requirements 
of shared data. 
Here the sensitivity score (SC) considered as 
guideline in selecting appropriate strategy for conflict 
resolution of shared data item. We introduce following 
strategies for the purpose of resolving multiparty privacy 
conflicts in OSNs. 
• Owner−overrides : In final decision making, the 
highest priority goes to owner’s decision. This 
strategy is totally owner controlling mechanism in 
data sharing. Based on the weighted decision 
voting scheme, we set ωow = 1, ωcb = 0 and ωst 
= 0,1 and the final decision can be made as 
follows: 
Decision = j         Permit if DVag = 1 
                                 Deny if DVag = 0  
• Full−consensus−permit : The final decision is deny, 
if any controller deny the access. This strategy can 
achieve the naive conflict resolution. The final 
decision can be derived as: 
Decision = j          Permit  if DVag = 1 
Deny otherwise  
 
• Majority−permit : This strategy permits (denies, 
resp.) a request if the number of controllers to 
permit (deny, resp.) the request is greater than the 
number of controllers to deny (permit, resp.) the 
request. The final decision can be made as: 
    Decision =j         Permit  if DVag ≥ ½  
              Deny  if DVag < ½  
V. Logical Representation of 
Multiparty Access Control 
We introduce an ASP program for multiparty 
authorization specification. 
a) Logical Definition of Controllers and Relationships 
The basic components and relations in our 
MPAC model can be directly defined with corresponding 
predicates in ASP. We have defined UDct as a set of 
user-to-data relations with controller type ct ∈ CT. Then, 
the logical definition of multiple controllers is as follows: 
• The owner controller of a data item can be 
represented as:  
OW(controller,data) ← UDOW(controller, data) ∧
 
(controller) ∧ D(data). 
 
 
CB(controller, data) ←
 
UDCB(controller, data)∧
 
U(controller) ∧
 
D(data).
 
 
 
ST(controller, data) ←
 
UDST
 
(controller, data)∧
 
U(controller) ∧
 
D(data).
 
•
 
The disseminator controller of
 
a data item can be 
represented as: 
 
DS(controller, data) ←
 
UDDS(controller, data)∧
 
U(controller) ∧
 
D(data).
 
Our MPAC model supports transitive 
relationships. Then, friends-of-friends can be 
represented as a transitive closure of friend relation with 
ASP rule as follows:
 
friendsOFfriends(U1, U2) ←
 
friendOf(U1, U2).
 
friendsOFfriends(U1, U3) ←
 
friendsOFfriends(U1, U2),  
friendsOFfriends(U2, U3).
 
b)
 
Logical Representation of Decision Voting Schemes
 
decision voting(C) = 1 ←
 
decision(C, permit).
 
decision voting(C) = 0 ←
 
decision(C, deny).
 
aggregation weight(K) ←
 
K = sum{weight(C) : 
controller(C)}.
 
aggregation decision(N) ←
 
N = sum{decision voting(C) 
× weight(C) : controller(C)}.
 
aggregation sensitivity(M) ←
 
M = sum{sensitivity 
voting(C) × weight(C) : controller(C)}.
 
c)
 
Logical Representation of Threshold-Based Conflict 
Resolution
 
 
  
 
 
d)
 
Logical Representation of Strategy-Based Conflict 
Resolution
 
 
 
weight(controllers) = 1 ←
 
OW(controller, data).
 
weight(controllers) = 0 ←
 
CB(controller, data).
 
weight(controllers) = 0 ←
 
ST(controller, data).
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(6)
(7)
(8)
 The stakeholder controller of a data item can be 
represented as: 
 The conflict resolution strategy for Owner−overrides 
is represented as:
 The conflict resolution strategy for Full−
consensus−permit is represented as:
• The contributor controller of a data item can be 
represented as: 
decision(controllers, permit) ←N >M ∧ aggregation 
decision(N) ∧ aggregation sensitivity(M).
decision(controllers, deny) ← not decision(controllers, 
permit).
decision(controllers, permit) ← N/K == 1∧ aggregation 
weight(K) ∧aggregation decision(N).
decision(controllers, deny) ← not decision(controllers, 
permit).
decision(controllers, permit) ← N/K == 1∧ aggregation 
weight(K) ∧aggregation decision(N).
decision(controllers, deny) ← not decision(controllers, 
permit).
  
  
 
 
 
 
decision(deny) ←
 
decision(controllers, deny).
 
decision(deny) ←
 
decision(disseminator, deny).
 
decision(permit) ←
 
not decision(deny).
 
 
 
Figure 3 : Snapshot of MController 
VI.
 
Implementation
 
MController is third-party application 
development for Facebook. This is hosted in an Apache 
Tomcat application server supporting PHP and MySQL 
database. MController application is based on the 
iFrame external application approach. Using the 
Javascript and PHP SDK, it accesses users’ Facebook 
data through the Graph API and Facebook Query 
Language. Once user install MController in his 
Facebook space and accepts the terms and conditions, 
then MController access the content and basic 
information of user. Mainly, it retrieves the list of all 
photos owned by user as well as tagged photos and 
uploaded. Now user access MController privacy settings 
on shared images and protect from other viewers.
 
A snapshot of main interface of MController is 
shown in Figure 3 illustrates that how MController runs in 
each step and execution. Initially the user selects the 
image which he needs share and click on share button 
as showing in figure 3.a. the figure 3.b shows share 
image and privacy setting option. This privacy setting 
option is the main aim of MController system. If the user 
selects the privacy settings option, settings page 
appeared as like figure 3.c. the figure 3.c shows the 
options of individual persons as well as groups. Here 
the user selects access or deny option for different 
groups like family, friends and coworkers. After settings 
completed, the user click on save button or else click on 
cancel button to reset the settings. Once the settings 
are saved by user, under the shared image, the list of 
visitors can appeared according to the user privacy 
© 2013   Global Journals Inc.  (US)
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 The conflict resolution strategy for Majority−permit 
is represented as:
decision(controllers, permit) ← N/K > 1/2 ∧ aggregation 
weight(K) ∧ aggregation decision(N).
decision(controllers, deny) ← not decision(controllers, 
permit).
 The conflict resolution strategy for Deny−overrides 
for dissemination control is represented as:
settings as shown in figure 3.d. The visitors list informed 
that who can only see and share the user’s image. 
VII. Related Work 
Access control for OSNs is still relatively a new 
research area for privacy issues. Presently several 
access control models for OSNs have been introduced. 
Fong et al. proposed an access control model that 
formalizes and generalizes the access control 
mechanism implemented in Facebook, which admitting 
arbitrary policy vocabularies that are based on 
theoretical graph properties. Fong recently formulated 
this paradigm called a Relationship- Based Access 
Control (ReBAC) model that bases authorization 
decisions on the relationships between the resource 
owner and the resource accessor in an OSN. Carminati 
et al. recently introduced  collaborative security policies, 
a new class of security policies, that basically enhance 
topology-based access control with respect to a set of 
collaborative users.  
VIII. Conclusion 
In this paper, we found the need of privacy for 
OSN and solution of collaborative authorization 
management of the shared data. We introduced 
MController technique to provide their own privacy 
preferences on a shared data by the different 
controllers. Additionally MPAC model evaluated 
providing decision voting schemes and the privacy 
evaluation.  
 
  
In the future work, we are planning to 
investigate advanced MController technique to provide 
privacy settings for the group of photos at a time, 
because users may be involved to put privacy setting for 
the number of photos at a time. By this MPAC model it is 
time consuming process. So that we would study 
advanced MController for shared data to automatic 
configure the privacy.
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